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Abstract—This paper introduces a new Bayesian fusion 
algorithm to combine more than one trust component (data 
trust and communication trust) to infer the overall trust 
between nodes. This research work proposes that one trust 
component is not enough when deciding on whether or not 
to trust a specific node in a wireless sensor network. This 
paper discusses and analyses the results from the 
communication trust component (binary) and the data trust 
component (continuous) and proves that either component 
by itself, can mislead the network and eventually cause a 
total breakdown of the network. As a result of this, new 
algorithms are needed to combine more than one trust 
component to infer the overall trust. The proposed 
algorithm is simple and generic as it allows trust 
components to be added and deleted easily. Simulation 
results demonstrate that a node is highly trustworthy 
provided that both trust components simultaneously 
confirm its trustworthiness and conversely, a node is highly 
untrustworthy if its untrustworthiness is asserted by both 
components. 
 
Index Terms—Trust, Bayesian, Fusion, Sensor, Network, 
Data, Communication 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trust is an old yet important issue in any networked 
environment that can solve some problems which lies 
beyond the power of traditional cryptographic security. 
Generally, trust plays a major role in establishing 
relationship between entities which has been studied 
mainly by social scientists for a long time. Trust is 
something humans use every day to promote interactions 
and accept risk; exchanging information with others, 
buying and selling and all the other interactions with the 
environment involve some form of trust.  
 
Trust and trust establishment between nodes in 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the starting point 
for constructing the network. Even though trust has been 
formalised as a computational model, it still means 
different things for different research communities. 
Therefore, it is argued in this paper that trust in WSNs 
can assume more than one definition, depending on the 
applications and/or the attributes involved in trust 
evaluation. Hence, trust is defined in this context as “The 
subjective probability by which node A depends on node 
B to fulfil its promises in performing an action and at the 
same time being reliable in reporting its sensed data”. 
 
Trust management in WSNs is predominantly based on 
routing messages regardless of the fact that 
communication has occurred or not [1-5]. This is known 
as “Communication Trust”. The introduction of sensed 
data, as discussed in [6] and [7], as a new core component 
when deciding to trust nodes in WSNs, represents a new 
challenge on “how much trust is enough, and which 
components should be included to decide on trust”. This 
new core component is called “Data Trust”. 
 
This paper argues that if the overall trust is solely 
based on communication trust, then the network might be 
misled, hence, untrustworthy nodes in terms of data trust 
might be classified as trusted nodes due to their 
communication capabilities and the same argument holds 
for the other case. That is, approaching the trust problem 
from one angle is not enough to decide on whether or not 
to trust a specific node in a WSN. Therefore, new trust 
models need to be developed in order to answer the 
questions of which components are to be involved when 
calculating trust and, how to combine these components 
to achieve overall trust given different scenarios and 
applications. 
In this paper, the previously designed trust model for 
WSNs, as discussed in [6] and [7], is extended to include 
both communication trust and data trust. The data trust 
model presented in [6, 7], is simulated and compared with 
the communication trust model presented in [1], and the 
results have proven that modelling trust using only one 
component might not be enough to decide the 
trustworthiness of nodes in a WSN. As a result of this, a 
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new Bayesian fusion algorithm is introduced to address 
this issue by combining both data and communication 
trust to infer the overall trust. The proposed algorithm is 
generic and allows more trust components to be plugged 
into the model to infer the total trust for different 
scenarios. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: 
Section 2 presents the problem statement and section 3 
discusses the trust components (communication trust and 
data trust). The Bayesian fusion algorithm is presented in 
section 4. In section 5 we present some of the simulation 
results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
II.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem addressed in this paper can be stated as: 
“Given a network of large number of sensor nodes 
deployed in some area distant from a fusion centre, as 
presented in Fig. 1. Sensor nodes perform measurements 
and the fusion centre would like to query statistics of the 
measured values. However, sensor nodes cannot report 
the measurements directly to the fusion centre, due to 
their power and range capability, so they employ a multi-
hop strategy for communicating with other nodes in the 
network to deliver the data to the fusion centre. That is, 
each node in the network acts as a host (senses events) 
and as a router (routes messages for other nodes) 
simultaneously. As there is no guarantee that all nodes in 
the discovered route are trusted nodes and will behave as 
expected, some malicious or selfish nodes might exist, 
and that can lead to network malfunctioning or even to a 
total breakdown of the network. So, how can we exclude 
the malicious sensor nodes that do not route messages 




Figure 1. Wireless sensor network example 
 
To further illustrate the problem, let us consider the 
following scenario for the network presented in Fig. 1, 
which assumes that a WSN consists of several sensor 
nodes and a fusion centre (FC). Nodes are deployed to 
monitor an event and to report the sensed data to the FC. 
Nodes can communicate, send and receive messages, 
even if some of them are malicious, but for unseen 
reasons (being faulty or malicious), they do not report 
their own sensed data and, vice versa, nodes do report 
their sensed data but do not route messages for other 
nodes. In other words, node (3) in Figure 1, for example, 
is forwarding all messages from node (1) and node (2) to 
the FC using a multi-hop route through nodes (4) and (5), 
which means that node (3) is very trustworthy from the 
communication point of view. On the other hand, node 
(3) is not reporting its actual data to other nodes in the 
network. For example, if node (3) is a malicious (having 
been captured by an enemy) node and because the 
reported data will affect it somehow, imagine that the 
sensed data are pointing to intruder personnel from the 
same group as node (3) entering and leaving a battle-
field: of course node (3) is not going to report it, so node 
(3) is untrustworthy from the data point of view. That is, 
node (3) is trustworthy from a communication point of 
view and at the same time it has been proven that it is 
untrustworthy from the data point of view. The same 
situation is valid when all three nodes are sending their 
sensed data, temperature, for example, but due to the high 
cost of communication in such networks and because of 
node (3) being selfish, it is not routing messages from 
nodes (1) and (2). In this situation, node (3) is trusted 
from the data point of view but not from the 
communication point of view. So a mechanism to judge 
and predict the behaviour of node (3) and to notify the 
other nodes and/or the FC about node (3)’s 
trustworthiness is needed, in order for appropriate actions 
to be taken. 
III.  TRUST COMPONENTS 
Based on the above illustration, the trust computational 
model for WSNs presented in [8, 9], is extended to reflect 
the new challenges, using more than one criterion to 
decide on trust. The extended trust computational model 
for WSNs, presented in Fig. 2, is a generic trust model, 
that is, new trust components affecting nodes’ 
trustworthiness in a network can be added to or removed 
from the model and the overall trust can be recalculated 
very easily. 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 2, trust in WSNs is a 
combination of communication trust and data trust, which 




Figure 2.  Extended trust computational model for WSNs 
A.  Communication Trust in WSNs 
Communication trust (CT), here, means the trust value 
calculated between nodes based on their cooperation in 
routing messages to other nodes in the network. In their 
trust model for sensor networks, Ganeriwal and 
Srivastava, in [1], extended the work of Josang and Ismail 
presented in [10] as a model to derive reputation ratings 
in the context of e-commerce. The Beta reputation system 
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is based on the Beta probability density function, Beta (α, 
β), and is given in (1), 
1 1( )( | , ) (1 )
( ) ( )
f p p pα βα βα β α β
− −Γ += −Γ Γ     (1) 
For each node nj, a reputation Rij can be carried by a 
neighbouring node ni. The reputation is embodied in the 
Beta model and carried by two parameters αij and βij. αij 
represents the number of successful transactions node ni 
had with, or observed about nj, and βij the number of 
unsuccessful transactions. The reputation of node nj, 
maintained by node ni, is shown in (2),  
( 1, 1)ij ij ijR Beta α β= + +     (2) 
Trust is defined as the expected value of the reputation 
and is given in (3), 
( ) { ( 1, 1)}
( 1)
( 2)
ij ij ij ij
ij
ij ij
T E R E Beta α β
α
α β
= = + +
+= + +
           (3) 
Second-hand information is presented to node ni by 
another neighbouring node, nk. Node ni receives the 
reputation of node nj by node nk, Rkj , in the form of the 
two parameters αkj and βkj. Using this new information, 
node ni combines it with its current assessment, Rij, to 
obtain a new reputation, newijR , as in (4), 
  ( ,  )n e w n e w n e wi j i j i jR B e ta α β=          (4) 
where node ni uses its reputation of node nk in the 
combination process. newijα and newijβ , shown in (5) and 
(6) respectively, are the updated  values for ijα and 
ijβ given by the authors of [1] by mapping the problem 
into a Dempster-Shaffer belief theory model [11], solving 
it using the concept of belief discounting, and 
undertaking a reverse mapping from belief theory to 
continuous probability. For more details on all these 
equations, readers are encouraged to refer to [1, 10, 12]. 
New
ijT , given in (7), is the updated CT value based on 
new
ijα and newijβ  values. 
*2*
( 2)*( 2) (2* )
ik kjNew
ij ij
ik kj kj ik
α αα α β α β α= + + + + +         (5) 
2* *
( 2)*( 2) (2* )
ik kjNew
ij ij
ik kj kj ik
α ββ β β α β α= + + + + +        (6) 
( ) { ( 1, 1)}
( 1)
( 2)
New New New New
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α β
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   (7) 
B.  Data Trust in WSNs 
Data trust (DT) is a new concept introduced in [13] to 
calculate trust in WSNs based on the actual sensed data 
of the sensors, and it is recommended that readers refer to 
[14] for a detailed explanation on the equations presented 
here, in order to avoid repetition. Reputation ,i jR  and 
trust ,i jT  between node ni and node nj are defined as 
discussed in the previous chapter and given in (8) and (9) 
respectively, 
2
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where ,i jμ  and 2,i jσ , represent the mean and variance 
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It is also argued that the second-hand information 
represents a Normal, Gaussian distribution with updated 
mean ,
new
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based on the above discussion, the newly updated DT 
value ,
New
i jT  between node ni and node nj will be 
calculated as in (14), 
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i j i jNew
i j New New
i j i j
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ε μ ε μφ φσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − −= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
              (14) 
    
Simulation experiments to verify the argument “one 
trust component might mislead nodes in a WSN, and 
distrusted nodes can be seen as very trustworthy”, were 
developed and conducted to calculate CT and DT 
between four nodes (1, 6, 7, and 13) in a sub-network of 
fifteen nodes, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Wireless sensor network diagram 
 
Initially, it is assumed that all nodes are normal; no 
faulty or malicious nodes exist in the network, so all 
nodes report their sensed data and route messages 
normally. The results presented in Fig. 4, demonstrate 
that all nodes in the sub-network trust each other and the 
trust value is increasing gradually until it reaches the 
maximum value for both DT and CT. 
 
 
Figure 4. All nodes are normal 
 
In a second simulation, whose results are presented in 
Fig. 5, node (13) is assumed to be malicious, not 
reporting data, so it is noticeable that the CT is gradually 
increasing to the maximum value between all nodes, as 
there is no communication error between nodes, while the 
DT trust is decreasing to the minimum value for node 
(13) as it is a malicious node, not reporting its sensed data 
to other nodes. In other words, node (13) is assumed to be 
a trusted node from a communication point of view, but 




Figure 5. Node 13 is not reporting data 
 
In a third simulation experiment, it is assumed that a 
communication error exists between nodes, so nodes can 
report their sensed data but are not routing messages 
between themselves, and the results presented in Fig. 6, 
below indicate that the CT is gradually decreasing to the 
minimum value between all nodes and the DT is 
gradually increasing to the maximum value, as all nodes 
are reporting their sensed data. Similarly in this case,  
nodes are assumed to be trusted from the data point of 
view, while in reality they are not, as they are not routing 
messages between themselves and the communication 
trust is decreasing to the minimum value. 
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Figure 6. All nodes have a communication error 
 
From the previous simulation results, it has been 
proven that one component for calculating trust in WSNs 
might not be enough, as it could mislead the whole 
network, so a new technique is required to combine more 
than one trust component to achieve the overall trust.  It 
has been argued that Bayesian fusion algorithms are the 
most suitable tools to combine trust components, as 
discussed in the following section. 
IV.  BAYESIAN FUSION ALGORITHM 
The Bayesian fusion structure illustrated in Fig. 7, is a 
representation of the newly created trust model given in 
Fig. 2; which is a substitution to the Bayesian network 
structure given in [14]; where C represents the 
communication trust, D represents the data trust and T 
represents the total trust. 
 
Using Bayes’ theorem, the probability of the total trust, 
given the data trust and communication trust, can be 
presented, as shown in (15), 
( | , ) ( | )( | , )
( | )
P D T C P T CP T D C
P D C
∗=                    (15) 
 
Figure 7. Bayesian fusion structure 
 
As discussed previously in the intrusion detection 
scenario illustrated in Fig. 1, in the case of a node always 
communicating but not reporting the data, C and D are 
independent. Because of that independence, the 
likelihood function ( | , )P D T C  in (15) can be presented, 
as in (16), 
( | , ) ( | )P D T C P D T=                (16) 
By substituting equation (16) in equation (15), the 
probability of the total trust will be as given in (17), 
( | ) ( | )( | , )
( | )
P D T P T CP T D C
P D C
∗=                (17) 
Applying Bayes’ theorem, ( | )P D T can be calculated 
as in (18), 
( | ) ( )( | )
( )
P T D P DP D T
P T
∗=                (18) 
By substituting (18) in (17), the result is given in (19), 
( | ) ( | ) ( )( | , )
( | ) ( )
P T D P T C P DP T D C
P D C P T
∗ ∗= ∗                (19) 
Equation (19), after ignoring the normalising factor 
and the other constants, it can be seen that the probability 
of the combined trust T is mainly equal to the 
multiplication of the probabilities of both trust 
components, C and D, as shown in (20), 
( | , ) ( | ) ( | )P T D C P T D P T C= ∗                   (20) 
In other words, the resulting distribution of both 
distributions – the Beta distribution used to calculate 
communication trust and the Normal distribution used to 
calculate data trust – is equal to the multiplication of both 
distributions, as illustrated in Fig. 8. 
 
















Figure 8. Multiplication of Beta and normal distributions 
 
The first distribution represents a Beta distribution, the 
second distribution represents a normal distribution and 
the third distribution represents the resulting distribution, 
the multiplication of the Beta and normal distributions. 
V.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
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To verify the theory given in the previous section, 
several simulations were conducted on the same sub-
network of nodes (1, 6, 7 and 13) from the network 
diagram presented in Figure 3. 
A.  All Nodes are Normal 
Fig. 9, below displays the results when all nodes in the 
sub-network are normal from both the communication 
and data point of view. The total trust value is increasing 
to the maximum value of one, as for the other trust 
values: data trust and communication trust.  
 
 
Figure 9. All nodes in the sub-network are normal 
B.  Node 13 is not Reporting Data 
Fig. 10, shows the results when node 13 is faulty from 
the data point of view, That is, node 13 is routing 
messages but not reporting sensed data. The data trust is 
decreasing to zero and the communication trust is 
increasing to one, the total trust is in between, which is 
reasonable; the total trust stays on the initial trust value 
assigned to the node. In other simulations the total trust 
might be higher or lower, depending on how long the 
node stays in the same situation. 
 




C.  All Nodes have a Communication Error 
 
Fig. 11, below shows the results when nodes are not 
routing messages. It explains the situation when there is a 
communication error but there is no data error, that is, all 
nodes are reporting their sensed data, but not routing 
messages for other nodes. As can be seen, the 
communication trust value for all nodes is decreasing 
towards the value of zero, while the data trust value is 
increasing towards the value of one. The total trust is 
again in the reasonable range, around the initial assigned 




Figure 11. All nodes have a communication error 
D.  All Nodes with Communication Error and Node 13 
has also a Data Error 
Fig. 12, below explains when there is a communication 
error between all nodes and a data error in node 13, that 
is, all nodes are not routing messages and node 13 is also 
not reporting its sensed data properly. As can be seen 
from Fig. 12, the communication trust value for all nodes 
is decreasing towards the value of zero, the data trust 
values for node 7 and node 6 are increasing towards the 
value of one, and the total trust value is around the initial 
assigned trust value. The interesting case here is that, for 
node 13, the communication trust value and the data trust 
value are decreasing towards the value of zero and this is 
also the case for the total trust value. 
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Figure 12. All nodes have a communication error and node 13 has also a 
data error 
 
In summary and as can be seen from the above 
illustrations, it has been proven that nodes in a WSN can 
be trusted from a communication point of view but 
distrusted from a data point of view, and vice versa. In 
other words, the node can be trusted and distrusted at the 
same time if only one trust component is considered. 
Therefore a new Bayesian fusion algorithm is introduced 
to combine both trust values – data trust and 
communication trust – and to produce the total trust 
which defines the node as a trusted or distrusted node. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that using one trust component to 
decide the trustworthiness of nodes in WSNs is not 
enough and can mislead the network. Therefore, more 
than one component should be considered when 
evaluating trust. Therefore, the two different trust 
components, the data trust and the communication trust, 
were reconsidered and a simulation comparison between 
them was conducted. It has been proven that a trusted 
node from the data point of view can be distrusted from a 
communication point of view and vice versa. This led to 
the extension of the trust computational model in WSNs 
to reflect the new challenges and to include both trust 
components – data trust and communication trust – as 
decisive factors regarding the trustworthiness of nodes. 
 
This paper has also presented a new Bayesian fusion 
algorithm to combine both trust components. The 
algorithm is generic and allows trust components to be 
added to and/or deleted from very smoothly and 
transparently. The simulation results for the newly 
introduced algorithm show that, if a node is trusted on 
one component and distrusted on the other component, 
then the combined trust value will be around the initially 
assigned trust value. In other words, one trust component 
by itself cannot fully decide the trustworthiness of nodes 
in WSNs. The results have also demonstrated that the 
node is very trustworthy if it is trusted by both 
components at the same time and, vice versa, the node is 
very untrustworthy if it is distrusted by both components. 
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